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Abstract
Many organisations have already realised that if they want to be successful, they must
have a sense of responsibility not only for their business activities, but also for the whole
society. That approach is entirely consistent with the basic idea of the concept of corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR). In the economic area of the CSR concept, corporate
governance plays an important role. Based on the OECD definition, corporate gover-
nance (CG) is a system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The
chapter provides the first comprehensive survey of corporate governance, the way to
estimate the level of CG to individual companies on the Slovak capital market through
our own corporate governance index. In analytical part of this chapter, we investigate
disclosure of corporate governance in selected enterprises in Slovakia for the period
2011–2015 and on the basis of this information we prepare a corporate governance
index. The corporate governance index helps assess the level of compliance with CG
principles in companies whose securities are listed on the Bratislava Stock Exchange.
The chapter fulfils a need for advancing knowledge on corporate governance and pro-
vides a practical framework for responsible behaviour of shareholders and managers in
socially responsible enterprises.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, corporate governance, corporate governance
index, Bratislava Stock Exchange, Slovakia, survey
1. Theoretical background
Responsibility in business again come to the fore and the current period is one of the factors that
can significantly contribute to achieving stability and sustainable growth in the global economic
environment. Enterprises should build their position on the principles of transparency and
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integrated approach to sustainable products and services, and the active cooperation of all
stakeholders contribute to the overall well-being of society and the entire planet.
Responsible behaviour is not a one-off or short-term matter; it has to be a long-term consistent
business philosophy. It often involves radical changes in the thinking of owners, managers and
employees of companies, who apart from their own corporate interests and needs and wishes
of customers also factor in long-term interests of the society.
Modern history of corporate social responsibility (CSR) began in the 1950s with the first
definition by CSR theorists Bowen [1] who perceived it as obligations of businessmen to
pursue those policies, to make those decisions or to follow those lines of action which are
desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society. Other authors supported this
idea, elaborated it and supplemented it with additional dimensions [2–6]. In the 1980s, various
alternative conceptions of social responsibility developed and commitments of companies
widened in relation to all stakeholders [7–9].
Social responsibility is based on the triple-bottom-line which comprises ‘3P’: profit–people–
planet. It is a philosophy in business which says that overall performance of a company should
be measured by its combined contribution (1) to the economic prosperity, (2) to the quality of
the environment and (3) to the social capital [10–13]. Based on the triple-bottom-line, there are
three basic areas of the responsible behaviour of companies – economic, social and environ-
mental. Each of them includes various activities from which company can choose based on its
specialisation and stakeholders' requirements. In the economic field, CSR emphasis on trans-
parency in the business and building good relations with stakeholders who can influence
economic activity of the company, especially with the customers, suppliers, shareholders,
investors and business partners [14].
Corporate governance (CG) also plays an important role in the economic area of the CSR
concept, particularly in relation to shareholders and employees. Corporate governance has
become a significant factor in managing organisations in the current global and complex
environment. In order to understand CG, it is important to highlight its definition. There is no
single accepted definition for corporate governance but it can be defined as a set of processes
and structures for controlling and directing an organisation. It constitutes a set of rules, which
governs the relationships between management, shareholders and stakeholders [15]. The term
”corporate governance“ has a clear origin from a Greek word ”kyberman“ meaning to steer,
guide or govern. From a Greek word, it moved to Latin, where it was known as ”gubernare“
and the French version of ”governor“. It could also mean the process of decision-making and
the process by which decisions may be implemented [16].
Corporate governance includes all types of firms and its definitions could extend to cover all of
the economic and non-economic activities. Literatures in CG provide some form of meaning on
governance, but fall short in its precise meaning of governance. Corporate governance deals
with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a
return to their investment [17]. Roubíček [18] states that the term corporate governance can
also be understood as an inner organisation of a company, that is, the structure of competency
of the advisory board and the board of directors and relations between shareholders and the
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management. According to Mallin [19] optimal management of a trading company means
protecting its creativity, freedom and flexibility and ensuring its continuous ability to create
wealth and welfare which is essential to the civil society. Authority is the brain of the company
cultivating executive to share the values with all shareholders and other parties involved.
Klírová [20] considers the assessment of business performance the main function of CG from
wider perspective than executive, that is, taking into consideration interests of all parties
legitimately involved, and in this way influencing the creation of business strategy by its
activity and its implementation with the aim of satisfying these interests. OECD’s [21] defini-
tion characterises the basis of CG very well – the system by which business corporations are
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights
and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, man-
agers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures for making
decisions in corporate affairs. Monks and Minow [22] also support this idea and define
corporate governance as relations between different parties during influencing the governance
and performance of companies, while shareholders and management are the primary parties
and employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and other interest groups are the secondary.
According to Mallin [19], the objective of corporate governance is to ensure that the firm is
managed in the best interest of shareholders and other stakeholders of the company. CG
supports transparency and accountability, which are key attributes for investors for the proper
management of the company.
The objective of creating and improving the corporate governance of companies is the devel-
opment of best practice based on the principles of good processed into a wide variety of
policies and codes. The first formulation of the CG principles was in 1992, when Sir Adrian
Cadbury, a member of the Institute of Directors, wrote the Cadbury Code of Best Practice of
Great Britain, in which he emphasises the principles of information openness, fairness and
responsibility in the terms of CG [23]. Later, in 1999 OECD composed basic principles of
management and governance. As a result of various accounting scandals at the end of the
millennium, European Commission issued Action Plan: European company law and corporate
governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable
companies in 2003. At the same time The US Government accepted Sarbanes-Oxley Act with
the aim to increase investors' protection by enhancing demands on the accuracy and correct-
ness of published financial documents. OECD has updated the original principles in 2004 and
added a separated principle laid down by the national regulator, which should promote
transparent and efficient market, comply with the laws and clearly define the division of
responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and law enforcement institutions.
OECD principles became the basis for the creation of national codes of corporate governance
in the most developed countries of the world. OECD updated and composed new G20/OECD
principles of corporate governance with the aim to increase the confidence of companies and
investors in the capital market in September 2015 in Ankara [24].
In Slovakia, Central European Corporate Governance Association (CECGA) has yet again
initiated and achieved the revision of the National Code of Corporate Governance in cooper-
ation with the representatives of Public Administration (the respective ministries) and the
Bratislava Stock Exchange in 2016 [25]. The foundation for this revision was, besides the new
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G20/OECD principles, the recommendations of the European Commission for the area of corpo-
rate governance (CG) related to independent members of the organisations' bodies, remunera-
tion and reporting (recommendations No. 2004/913/ES, 2005/162/ES, 2009/385/ES and 2014/208/
EU). The Guidelines of the UNO on human rights of 2011 were also taken into consideration.
Corporate governance is becoming more difficult with the growing globalisation. Results of
inappropriate governance in (not only multinational) companies came out mainly during the
crisis and fully influenced not only companies themselves, but also the global economy. The
failure of using CG principles, insufficient transparency and information asymmetry were also
the reasons for the negative development. Information asymmetry or the imperfection of infor-
mation is considered as one of the reasons for the failure of the market mechanism and the price
system in allocating production sources. Stiglitz [26] defines it as a situation in which various
information are available for different people (or market entities). In this context the information
asymmetry emerges not only between managers and shareholders, but also between investors
and all stakeholders of the company. Each group follows its own interests with the aim to
maximise its own benefit which is the main motive for the information asymmetry formation.
One of the ways to eliminate information asymmetry is responsible implementation of corporate
governance principles, which many authors of foreign studies confirm [27–29].
Level of adherence to corporate governance principles can also indicate the development of
capital market and business environment of a country. Implementation of CG principles has
probably positive impact on a variety of corporate management’s areas [9, 16–17, 31]. Mallin
[19] and Claessens and Yurtoglu [32] summarise these positive impacts as follows:
• better access of the company to the external funding sources. Access to the funding
sources stimulates higher investments, higher growth and the creation of new jobs;
• lowering the costs of capital and related higher company valuation; company’s attractive-
ness for investors will increase which leads to growth and higher employment;
• improvement of operational performance thanks to better source allocation and more
effective governance which creates wealth in general;
• better relations with all company’s stakeholders – responsible implementation of CG
principles can generally minimise the occurrence of financial crises which imply economic
and social costs.
2. Data and methods
The chapter aims to investigate disclosure of information on corporate governance in compa-
nies whose securities are listed on the Bratislava Stock Exchange and on the basis on this
information to compile own corporate governance index, through which it is possible to assess
the level of compliance with corporate governance principles in these companies in Slovakia
for the period 2011–2015.
Entrepreneurship - Development Tendencies and Empirical Approach250
The subject of our research was companies whose securities are listed on the Bratislava Stock
Exchange over the period 2011–2015. There were registered 87 share issuers and 11 issuers of
bonds in 2011, according to data from the National Bank of Slovakia. The total number of
companies in 2011 was 104 due to the fact that some companies issue shares and also bonds.
The total number of issuers in 2012 was 109 companies and in 2013 was 102 companies. The
issuer on the Bratislava Stock Exchange does not have information disclosure obligations to
receive a security for trading on a multilateral trading system. For this reason, we have
excluded companies on the Multilateral Trading Facility. There were 66 companies in 2014
and 65 companies in 2015. The number of companies which quote their shares and bonds is
in Table 1.
We obtained the information from the companies´ annual financial reports which are
available in the Central Register of Regulated Information (hereinafter ”CERI“), the Regis-
ter of Financial Statements (hereinafter ”RUZ“) and on the companies’ websites. We
researched the disclosure in the Register of Financial Statements for 2013. The amendment
to the Accounting Act No. 431/2002, as subsequently amended (hereinafter ”Accounting
Act“), which entered into force on 1 January 2014, introduces a new obligation for issuers
to publish the annual financial report in RUZ pursuant to § 23, paragraph 2 of this Act. The
Act on Stock Exchange No. 429/2002, as subsequently amended (hereinafter “the Act on
Stock Exchange“), has been amended as well. According to § 45, paragraph 1 of this Act,
the issuer is required to provide regulated information in CERI of the National Bank of
Slovakia. This legal obligation is fulfilled when the issuer has entered regulated informa-
tion in RUZ. For this reason, we have extended our evaluation to include information
disclosure in RUZ.
We have compiled our own corporate governance index in order to complete for an overall
assessment of the level of corporate governance in individual companies. Authors of foreign
studies [27–30] also used a corporate governance index in determining the level of corporate
governance, but often without specifically indicating its method. In our case, we could not take
over one of the models, but we have compiled own index suited to the Slovak capital market
standards and disclosure by companies. This index uses ordinal measures of various evalua-
tive criteria. The criteria were as follows:
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
The number of shares issuers 87 92 84 47 48
The number of bonds issuers 11 11 11 13 11
The number of issuers of shares and also bonds 6 6 7 6 6
Total number of issuers 104 109 102 66* 65*
*The issuer does not have information disclosure obligations to receive a security for trading on a multilateral trading
system. For this reason, we have excluded companies in the multilateral trading system.
Table 1. The number of shares issuers and bonds issuers.
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a. disclosure of the current annual report in Central Register of Regulated Information,
b. disclosure of the current annual report in Register of Financial Statements,
c. disclosure of the current annual report on the companies´ websites,
d. the scope and clarity of the information about corporate governance in annual report
according to § 20 of the Accounting Act,
e. the scope, clarity and quality of information in the corporate governance statement,
f. information about board members, such as names, experience, responsibility and
functions,
g. information about the structure and amount of remuneration for individual members of
the board,
h. information about risk management, defined predictable risks and risk quantification,
i. information about the establishment and activities of an Audit Committee, or the failure
to establish one,
j. information about the establishment and activities of a Remuneration Committee or the
failure to establish one and
k. information about the establishment and activities of a Nomination Committee or the
failure to establish one.
During the evaluation of corporate governance criteria there were several problems and
limitations. Legislation in force does not require the company to disclose information on the
website of the company. Obligations for companies that were the subject of the survey are to
disclose information for the current accounting period in CERI or RUZ. In order to appreciate
the efforts of the company to inform stakeholders through the website, corporate governance
index also took account of this fact. The company, which released information in CERI, RUZ
and on its website also, reached the highest score in that category. Assessment of the level and
quality of information in the Statement on Corporate Governance was another criterion.
Particular of the Statement on Corporate Governance are specified in § 20 of the Accounting
Act. Some companies in structuring the Statement on Corporate Governance followed the
legal requirements, but the content of the information was insufficient. Other companies used
the statement forms prepared by Central European Corporate Governance Association
(CECGA). Due to the objective assessment of the quality of information in the statement we
did not evaluate the structure of statements on corporate governance, but the quality of the
information, that is, whether the company said only general information or comprehensively
and concisely explain each point of statement, together with deviations from the Code. The
obligation to establish an audit committee is required by § 19 of the Accounting Act. Based on
this legal requirement, the entity does not have an audit committee if its supervisory board
performs the activities of the audit committee or the parent company has established a commit-
tee. The assessment of whether the company has established or has not established audit com-
mittee would not provide us an objective assessment. Therefore, we evaluated a comprehensive
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disclosure of the audit committee – information on the establishment of the Committee, the
explanation if the committee is not established, description of activities and results of the work
of the committee during the reporting period. We did the same with the other two committees.
We have compiled corporate governance index for each reporting company with aim to
estimate levels of corporate governance. The corporate governance index consists of the
criteria, which are to be assessed by ordinal character based on their importance. Weightings
are assigned to each criterion and are determined on the basis the expert estimation and
theoretically supported by Saaty´s method of determining the weights. The Saaty´s method
compares pairs and evaluation is entered into a matrix S = (sij) in the following way:
ðsijÞ ¼
1 – i and j are equivalent
2 – i is slightly preferred over j
5 – i is strongly preferred over j
7 – i is very strongly preferred over j
9 – i is absolutely preferred over j
8>>><
>>>:
(1)
The values 2, 4, 6 and 8 are the intermediate stage evaluation. For ease of calculation used
method of least squares logarithmic:
F ¼
Xk
i¼1
X
j>i
ln sij  ln vi  ln vj
  2
! min (2)
Conditions for validity:
Pk
i¼1
vi ¼ 1.
The solution is the geometric mean of the row of the matrix S:
vi ¼
Qk
j¼1
sij
" #1=k
Pk
i¼1
Qk
j¼1
sij
" #1=k (3)
where i = 1,…, k.
To an objective assessment of the importance of each criterion in corporate governance index
criteria, we assigned weights by expert estimate that are as follows:
CG index ¼ 0:095∗ aþ bþ cð Þ þ 0:079∗dþ 0:159∗eþ 0:079∗f þ 0:079∗gþ 0:079∗h
þ 0:079∗iþ 0:079∗jþ 0:079∗k
(4)
Individual assessment criteria were given a score and assigned a weight according to their
degree of importance. We set the value of coefficients based on expert estimation and supported
by Saaty´s method of determining the weights. We identified through expert estimation that
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criterion “the scope, clarity and quality of information in corporate governance statement” as the
most important criterion in the index. Other important criteria with lower value of the coefficient
were: “disclosure of the current annual report in CERI”, “disclosure of the current annual report
in RUZ” and “disclosure of the current annual report on the companies´ websites”. Other criteria
were the same coefficients with respect to their significance in comparison with the mentioned
higher ranked criteria in the index. Each monitored company was scored using a weighted sum
of the evaluated criteria. This allowed corporate governance comparisons across companies. We
have compiled Saaty´s matrix, which is shown in Tables 2 and 3, which is evaluated 11 criteria in
the index and their importance in pairwise comparisons.
a b c d e f g h i j k
A 1 1 1 2 0.33 2 2 2 2 2 2
B 1 1 1 2 0.33 2 2 2 2 2 2
C 1 1 1 2 0.33 2 2 2 2 2 2
D 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1
E 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
F 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1
G 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1
I 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1
J 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2. Saaty´s matrix.
Category Percentage Rank
Disclosure of the current annual report in CERI 11.5 2
Disclosure of the current annual report in RUZ 11.5 2
Disclosure of the current annual report on the companies´ websites 11.5 2
Quality of information in the corporate governance statement 6.1 5
Information about board members 22.9 1
Information about the structure and amount of remuneration 6.1 5
Audit Committee 6.1 5
Nomination Committee 6.1 5
Remuneration Committee 6.1 5
Information about risk management 6.1 5
Table 3. Weighting of each index criteria based on Saaty´s method.
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Corporate governance index with weights set through Saaty´s method is as follows:
CG index ¼ 0:115∗ aþ bþ cð Þ þ 0:061∗dþ 0:229∗eþ 0:061∗f þ 0:061∗gþ 0:061∗h
þ 0:061∗iþ 0:061∗jþ 0:061∗k:
(5)
3. Results
Aiming to emphasise the importance of applying the principles of corporate governance also
in the regulated Slovak market, we carried out a research in the period of 2011–2015 in
companies, whose securities are listed on the Bratislava Stock Exchange. Outcomes of the
research then became the foundation for creating corporate governance index which is the
determining indicator of the level of adherence to corporate governance principles in Slovakia.
3.1. Disclosure of information in the context of corporate governance
One of the basic governance framework in Slovakia is the framework on disclosure and
transparency. It is in the interest of the companies eliminate information asymmetry, which
occurs mainly between managers, shareholders, investors and other stakeholders.
According to § 34 of the Act on Stock Exchange, as subsequently amended, the companies that
issue securities are required to publish the Annual Financial Report, which shall include
information on corporate governance, no later than 4 months after the end of the financial
year. During the reporting period, there were companies that failed to meet this legal obliga-
tion and did not publish the information in CERI, RUZ and even on their website. In annual
comparison 2011–2013, the proportion of these companies remained almost unchanged (25
companies) and in 2013 the number dropped by only one company. After the exclusion of
companies without information obligations, we noticed a significant decreased in the number
of companies that did not disclose information in CERI, in RUZ and on company´s website
either.
In 2011 there were 23 companies (about 22%) that disclosed the current annual financial report
in CERI or on the website. In 2011 and 2013, researched companies preferred disclosure in
CERI. Inverse trend was recorded in 2012, which was dominated by disclosure of documents
on the company website. We appreciate the on-year increase in the proportion of companies
that published documents in CERI and on their website also. This share decreased from 53.8%
in 2011 to 24.6% companies in 2015. This fact indicates the effort to inform all stakeholders on
the part of most companies in Slovakia, which in the long term can contribute to the improve-
ment of transparency in the Slovak capital market.
During the evaluation of the transparency in 2013 we took into account the disclosure in RUZ,
for example, companies can disclose information in CERI, on their website and in RUZ. The
share of companies, that disclose documents in 2 of 3 options, was at 67.6/%, that is, 69
companies. The companies preferred to publish documents in CERI before in RUZ. In the year
2013, only eight companies published annual reports in RUZ. For the mentioned period, we
noticed only one company that published the documents in CERI, on the website and in RUZ.
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During the monitored years 2014–2015, we did not list companies that do not have the
information obligation (Multilateral Trading Facility). Interesting is the growing trend of
companies that have published information in CERI, RUZ and even on their website. The
number of companies mentioned was 43 (66.2%) for 2015 (Table 4).
3.2. Content of the annual report and the statement of compliance with corporate
governance
The annual financial report includes the annual report, financial statements and the statement
of the financial statements' fairness made by the issuer’s executives. According to § 20 of the
Accounting Act, the annual report includes the Statement on Corporate Governance as well.
Nevertheless, there are still a large percentage of companies that in their annual report did not
mention any information about corporate governance. As shown in Table 5, trying to inform
shareholders and investors was apparent mainly in 2012, when 64 companies disclose basic
information on corporate governance through their annual reports and companies also pro-
vided comprehensive information. The share of companies reporting minimum basic informa-
tion in their annual report was 54.8% in 2011 and increased to 61.5% in 2015.
The most important area of our research was to evaluate the content of the Statement on
Corporate Governance. Companies can write their statement based on the requirements of
the Accounting Act or use the statement form for the Statement on Corporal Governance Code
drafted by CECGA, which allows companies to comprehensively inform on the level of
implementation of the corporate governance principles. Some companies wrote the statement,
which contained only a reference to the internal company materials, the laws or information
were general. We conclude that these companies consider drafting the statement on corporate
governance as a formal matter (Table 6).
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No information is published in CERI, in RUZ and on company´s website either 25 25 24 0 2
Annual report is published in one of the three options (CERI, RUZ, company´s website) 23 8 8 6 4
Annual report is published in two of the three options (CERI, RUZ, company´s website) 56 76 69 21 16
Annual report is published in CERI, RUZ, company´s website 0* 0* 1 39 43
*Companies have an obligation to publish information in RUZ since 2015.
Table 4. Disclosure of information (the annual report).
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No information about CG 47 39 53 31 25
It contains partial information on CG 43 64 27 20 22
It contains information on CG and compliance with the Code 14 6 22 15 18
Table 5. Content of the annual report.
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3.3. Composition and remuneration of board members
According to the Code, Principle IV, paragraph 5, the company discloses information about its
board members, including their qualifications, selection process and their independence. This
obligation is also imposed by the Accounting Act, § 20, paragraph 6. Based on the recommen-
dations of the Code and the Accounting Act, we evaluated the disclosure of information about
the board members. The negative fact is that there are still companies which do not even
publish basic information on the composition of their boards. The number of these companies
was at 27 in 2011, increased to 33 companies in 2013 and then in 2015 the mentioned compa-
nies were only 10 (Table 7).
In context with the identified failures in corporate governance we also included in the survey
information on the remuneration of board members. The disclosure on remuneration of board
members is still an area that most companies have carefully protected. As can be seen from
Table 8, about 60% of companies did not disclose at least cumulative data and no further
information on the remuneration of board members.
Some companies paid remuneration to board members despite losses shown during the
reporting period. This may encourage managers to take a higher risk and thus adversely
affect the performance of the company. The risk of moral hazard for a member of a board
who is not punished for their failure is very high. The method of adjustment of remuneration
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No specific information on CG 57 61 68 28 30
The statement contains a brief explanation of each item 40 28 12 25 25
The statement contains an explanation of each item and the reason for deviation form
compliance with the Code
7 20 22 13 10
Table 6. Statement on corporate governance.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No information 27 31 33 9 10
Only the names of board members 64 64 57 46 43
Published the names of board members, together with the qualifications, roles and
responsibilities and managerial posts
13 14 12 11 12
Table 7. Composition of board members.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No information 61 63 65 47 51
Cumulative data about remuneration 34 39 32 15 10
Disclosed the amount of remuneration of board members and managers of the company
or remuneration disclosed for individual boards of the company
9 7 5 4 4
Table 8. Remuneration of board members.
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and incentive system in companies has a significant impact on risk management and for this
reason we took into account information about risk management in the survey. Risk manage-
ment methods, defined predictable risks and in some cases the quantification of risks is very
valuable information for shareholders and potential investors. The Code, Principle IV, also
recommends disclosure of information on ex-ante risks to the extent that is necessary to fully
inform investors about serious and predictable risks associated with the company.
Favourable results were observed in the proportion of companies providing sufficient infor-
mation about risk management as well as predictable risks. The proportion of companies
increased from 15.38% (16 companies) in 2011 to 29.23% (19 companies) in 2015. According to
the Accounting Act § 20, the company has to describe the risk management systems in its
annual report. However, the most of monitored companies did not state any or insufficient
information on risk management. The number of the companies is shown in Table 9.
3.4. Audit, remuneration and nomination committees
Other criteria that were included in the survey related to the area of establishment of commit-
tees as recommended by the Code. The Audit Committee should make proposals and recom-
mendations on the performance of internal control and external audit. According to § 19 of the
Accounting Act, an audit committee is mandatory for companies that issue securities on a
regulated market. The Audit Committee does not have to be set up separately if the supervi-
sory board carries out activities normally done by this committee. It is surprising, that despite
the legal obligation, approximately 50% of companies did not provide information on the
Audit Committee in its annual report during the years 2011–2013. On the positive side, the
share of these companies fell to 38.46% in 2015. Clearly disclosed information on the establish-
ment and functioning of an Audit Committee during the reporting period had only 19, 13, 17
and 8 companies (Table 10).
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No specific information 72 82 69 43 38
Basic information about risk management and defined predictable risks 16 10 11 8 8
Comprehensive information about risk management and risk quantification 16 17 22 15 19
Table 9. Information on risk management.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No information 51 55 50 31 25
Information on whether the committee was or was not established (reasons why it was
not established)
34 41 35 27 32
It is established, a description of the activities of the committee and the results of its
activities
19 13 17 8 8
Table 10. Audit committee.
Entrepreneurship - Development Tendencies and Empirical Approach258
According to principle V of the Code, it is recommended to establish other committees in
companies as well: The Remuneration and Nomination Committees. In general, the survey
results in evaluation of these two committees are not favourable but after considering the
annual comparison, slight tendency to improve the disclosure was noted.
Approximately four (modus) of the companies did not provide any information on the Remu-
neration Committee, whose main role is to propose and make recommendations on the remu-
neration of board members and management. The Remuneration Committee was set up in 8
banking and insurance companies. Approximately 80% of companies do not disclosure infor-
mation about the Remuneration Committee (Table 11).
Even less attention is paid to the Nomination committee. Most of the companies (approxi-
mately 85% of the companies) do not report on whether the Nomination Committee was or
was not established. Over the period 2011–2013, only one company set up the Nomination
Committee and two companies in 2015. The number of the companies is shown in Table 12.
3.5. The number of board member, proportion of women and employees on Companies'
boards
One of the principles of corporate governance, the responsibilities of the board, is closely
related to the issue of gender equality. According to this principle the board should ensure
the strategic management of the company, the effective monitoring of management and should
act responsibly towards both society and shareholders. These activities may be determined by
many factors and one of them is gender equality. European Commission claims that the
progress in gender equality can have the following positive impacts [33]:
• improved company performance: companies with higher share of women at top levels can
deliver strong organisational and financial performance;
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No information 88 87 80 53 51
Information on whether the committee was or was not established (reasons why it was
not established)
12 18 17 10 10
It is established, a description of the activities of the committee and the results of its
activities
4 4 5 3 4
Table 11. Remuneration committee.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
No information 91 92 85 58 56
Information on whether the committee was or was not established (reasons why it was
not established)
12 16 16 8 7
It is established, a description of the activities of the committee and the results of its
activities
1 1 1 0 2
Table 12. Nomination committee.
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• better quality of decision-making: a more diverse board of directors can contribute to
better performance because decisions are based on evaluating more alternatives;
• improved corporate governance and ethics: the quality of corporate governance and
ethical behaviour can be higher in companies with a high share of women on boards;
• better use of the talent pool: 60% of university graduates in Europe are women. Systemat-
ically including suitable candidates of both sex ensures that new board members are
selected from the very best candidates, both male and female.
Due to the last argument of the European Commission, we decided to assess what the percent-
age of women directors and supervisory boards of companies on the Slovak regulated market
for the period 2011–2015. Table 13 presents the percentage of the share of women in the total
number of directors and the supervisory board.
We appreciate the rising median value, which was in 2011 at 17%, increased at 22% in 2013 and
in the last surveyed year 2015 was at 17%. The average representation of women increased
year on year 2012/2013 from 23 to 24%, while the average in the EU-28 was lower at 18%.
Among the companies were some that did not have any woman on the board or supervisory
board. The percentage of these companies decreased from 62.5% in 2011 to 55.4% in 2015.
Women on board of directors were not represented in 65 companies in 2011 and 2013 and in 70
companies in 2012. The number of these companies was twice more compared with companies
without the representation of women on the supervisory boards. The number of companies
which did not have representation of women on the supervisory board was 36 in 2011, 32 in
2013 and 29 in 2015. The percentage of these companies increased from 34.6% in 2011 to 44.6%
in 2015. The average number of women on boards of directors was around 0.44 and average
number of women on supervisory board oscillated around one women. Women were
represented on the supervisory boards more frequently than on boards of directors.
The number of members of the boards and supervisory board has an impact on the effective-
ness of these authorities, the company’s performance and the degree of information asymme-
try [29]. For the years 2011–2015, we found out how many members were in the board and the
supervisory board of the companies on the Slovak regulated market. The results are available
in Tables 14 and 15.
Median and mode number of directors for the whole period was three members and the same
conclusion was also in the number of supervisory boards members. Companies thus meet the
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Median 17% 20% 22% 16.67% 16.67%
Modus 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Average 23% 23% 24% 20.74% 22.55%
Standard deviation 20.02% 21% 21.05% 19.56% 21.24%
The number of companies with no female representation 24 29 26 19 19
Table 13. Proportion of women on companies’ boards.
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legal obligation (the Commercial Code no. 513/1991, § 200) about a minimum number of
members of the supervisory board.
3.6. Corporate governance index
We evaluated the level of corporate governance using the corporate governance index. Table 16
shows the basic characteristics of corporate governance index for the period 2011–2015. Cor-
porate governance index reached a minimum value at 0 and maximum at 1.63 for whole
reporting period. Companies achieved an average value of the index from 0.48 points to 0.66
points. Standard deviation of the mean had a growing tendency, from 0.38 in 2011 to 0.42
points in 2013 and then the value dropped to 0.46 points in 2015. Distribution asymmetry is
evident from the value of skewness and kurtosis parameters. A positive value of skewness
indicates to us that the mean is greater than the median – most of the values of the index are
lower than the mean. We found out that there were higher proportions of companies with
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Median 3 3 3 3 3
Modus 3 3 3 3 3
Average 3.5 3.34 3.38 3.53 3.22
Standard deviation 1.4 1.48 1.56 1.59 1.52
Table 14. The number of members of the board.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Median 3 3 3 3 3
Modus 3 3 3 3 3
Average 3.81 3.72 3.57 3.91 3.63
Standard deviation 1.56 1.43 1.57 2.93 1.1
Table 15. The number of members of the supervisory board.
N Min Max Median Modus Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Stat. Std. E Stat. Std. E
CG Index 2011 104 0.00 1.38 0.4275 0.00 0.4847 0.38007 0.405 0.237 0.738 0.469
CG Index 2012 109 0.00 1.38 0.4270 0.00 0.5094 0.39455 0.332 0.231 0.838 0.459
CG Index 2013 102 0.00 1.38 0.4270 0.00 0.5072 0.42421 0.420 0.239 1.01 0.474
CG Index 2014 66 0.10 1.47 0.6335 0.348 0.6548 0.33109 0.357 0.295 0.721 0.582
CG Index 2015 65 0.00 1.63 0.5230 0.443 0.6624 0.34098 0.604 0.297 0.127 0.586
Table 16. Descriptive statistics of corporate governance index.
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below-average value of corporate governance index. Approximately 20% of companies in each
reference year did not disclose information in the right form or information not disclosed at all.
Therefore, we could not prepare corporate governance index for these companies. Based on the
negative values of the kurtosis there were confirmed a platykurtic distribution. We can con-
clude that the incidence of extreme value is less frequent compared to the normal distribution
for the period 2011–2015.
The main benefit of CG index creation is seen in the fact that on the basis of our proposed
procedure, the level of corporate governance in selected companies in Slovakia has been
estimated for the very first time. With our help, the CECGA thus achieved a detailed picture
of the level of information which is available for public in these enterprises, and at the same
time it obtained an overview of which enterprises appear to be the best in this field. This
enables a year-to-year comparison, or an estimate, of how the trend develops in time.
Awarding the best companies by Central European Corporate Governance Association for
2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 based on our index have an impact on the visibility of corporate
governance topics in Slovakia and increase the motivation of companies to report quality
information on compliance with corporate governance principles.
4. Conclusions
Adverse long-term development in the Slovak capital market has significantly strengthened
the position of commercial banks in the financial market. Companies tend to preferentially
provide information to commercial banks as opposed to publicly inform potential investors
about the company. From on-year comparison it was apparent slight increase in awareness and
the quality of the reported information on corporate governance. The most significant changes
were observed in evaluating the disclosure of information in the share of companies that their
annual report is published in CERI, RUZ and on company´s website.
Positive changes occurred also in the establishment of committees and availability of informa-
tion on their activities, as well as in the evaluation of risk management. The survey has
revealed us areas where there was a decrease in the level of reporting. We evaluated negatively
disclosure the Statement on Corporate Governance and content of the information in this
statement. The share of companies that did not have the Statement on Corporate Governance
or information in the Statement was not sufficient exceeded approximately 50% during
selected years. The negative trend was also identified in the increase of the share of companies
that not disclosed enough information about board members and their remuneration. The
percentage of these companies increased from 58.7 in 2011 to 78.5 in 2015. It is important to
notice that there are still companies that rely on outdated Unified Code or develop their own
code. The positive finding is that the number of such companies decreased.
Based on the presented results of the survey, we compiled the corporate governance index for
each company which securities are listed on the Bratislava Stock Exchange. The Central Europe
Corporate Governance Association now uses our proposed methodology and compile and
publish the ranking of the companies in context their CG principles implementation every year.
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Outputs of the survey have expanded our knowledge of corporate governance in Slovakia and
showed significant weaknesses in compliance with fundamental legal obligations by compa-
nies. A positive fact is we indicate the efforts by companies of at least some disclosure of
information on corporate governance. We expect that the activities of the CECGA and annual
awarding the best companies based on our compiled index, will increase interest in the topic
of corporate governance, help to raise awareness and attract the attention of a wider audience.
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